How to Deepen Partnerships with Civil Society in IDA- and IBRD-Financed Operations

Summary of a Report by Partnership for Transparency (PTF)

The historic expansion of the World Bank (Evolution) includes goals to deepen partnerships with civil society and tap local knowledge. It is formulating a plan to do this. In this context, PTF has done a detailed analysis of the state of citizens and civil society organizations’ engagement (CSE) in IDA and IBRD (the Bank) supported operations at the country level and formulated ten recommendations for expanding and adequately financing CSE. The PTF report titled Partnering with Civil Society for Citizen-Driven Country Engagement, Delivery, and Accountability in IDA- and IBRD-Financed Operations is available at www.ptfund.org. A summary of key findings and recommendations of the report is presented below.

Key Findings

1. The Bank has experience and good foundations for deepening partnerships with civil society. Making this happen will require proactive management actions to clarify policy, guide staff and clients, and close gaps in financing. The Bank lacks a CSE policy statement, and the Bank’s last progress report on collaboration with CSOs is more than a decade old.

2. CSOs from the global south indicate that consultations organized by the Bank often appear tokenistic, and lack of funding for analytical work is a major constraint to their substantive participation in country dialogues. Expanding direct support for local CSOs for knowledge content creation would be in line with the Knowledge Compact’s goals under the Evolution.

3. The Bank could more effectively promote locally led development and localization by expanding the use of multistakeholder platforms (MSPs) supported under IDA19 as well as the MSPs established by the Open Government Partnership in 75 countries (many are IDA/IBRD members).

4. Adequate civic space is essential for implementing the citizen, stakeholder, and CSO engagement activities included in Bank-supported operations. Currently, the Bank does not guide staff to assess civic space and agree with clients on appropriate measures to ensure adequate civic space for planned CSE.

5. Many implementing agencies of the Bank-financed projects have implementation capacity limitations that will be further stressed as IDA/IBRD financing rapidly expands. While expanding CSE may not solve all the challenges, it could result in faster and better implementation than by governments acting alone. CSOs can help, without slowing down project processing times, in at least three ways:
   a. CSOs can engage in service delivery and facilitate the design and implementation of citizen and stakeholder engagement activities in a given project;
   b. CSOs can provide on-demand contractual services to project implementing agencies (IAs), especially in fragile, conflict, and violent (FCV) situations; and
   c. CSOs can carry out/facilitate third-party monitoring to improve process legitimacy, grievance redress, results, and responsiveness to beneficiary needs.

While project financing for the above activities is available in principle, in practice, it is rarely evident in project approval, supervision, and completion documents. To fix these issues, staff guidance, reporting requirements, and monitoring and evaluation metrics need to be improved.

6. According to the Bank’s assessment, over half of the IDA-financed projects face substantial or high fiduciary and governance risks. The risks of leakages due to corruption, fraud, and waste will magnify as the IDA and IBRD expand financing, especially for budget support loans.

7. The Bank relies on borrowers’ transparency and accountability systems and its own procurement and financial management policies to address these risks. It does a good job. Evidence shows that partnering with civil society can help the Bank do a better job. However, the Bank rarely uses this option and lacks suitable mechanisms to fund such partnerships.

8. Acute funding gaps for local CSOs prevent them from meaningfully helping the IDA deliver more and better results with integrity. The Bank-hosted trust funds provide negligible amounts of funding to local CSOs. Analysis of OECD-DAC data shows that only a fraction (around 1% of ODA implemented by CSOs) was provided directly to local CSOs. Investing a tiny fraction of the proposed largest-ever IDA21 assistance to expand partnerships with local CSOs could have significant financial, social, and economic benefits and help counter corruption.
Ten Recommendations

#1: Clarify policies for collaboration with CSOs beyond consultations; reinstate staff guidance, including for explicit funding within the project life cycle for planned CSO engagement and periodic progress reporting with measurable indicators; and make the Bank’s contract awards database searchable in the contracts awards to CSOs.

#2: Expand opportunities for local CSO participation in the enhanced country engagement model and knowledge work by (a) updating the business processes for meaningful CSO knowledge inputs; and (b) expanding and strengthening the use of multistakeholder platforms such as those established under IDA19 and by the Open Government Partnership.

#3: Institute a program to provide direct grants to local CSOs for analytical work to enable meaningful participation in core analytics and country-owned multistakeholder platforms.

#4: Direct staff to conduct civic space assessments to identify actions needed to ensure space for citizen, CSO, and other stakeholder engagement activities planned in Bank-financed operations. Include appropriate country performance indicators on civic space in the proposed redesign of the corporate scorecard and accompanying M&E systems, and in the Country Policy and Institutional Assessment Guidelines.

#5: Update the citizen engagement framework, with due public consultations, as part of the new operating model. The update should elaborate on the role of CSOs in facilitating citizen engagement in financing and country engagement activities and emphasize the quality of implementation, earmarking of adequate funding for citizen and CSO engagement, and monitoring of outputs and outcomes.

#6: Assess the adequacy of staff deployment and incentives in country offices to facilitate citizen and CSO engagement and augment as needed.

#7: Issue staff guidance to expand and monitor citizen and CSO-led third-party monitoring to improve process legitimacy and results in investment projects, program for results loans, and development policy financing.

#8: Establish the baseline and increase the attention devoted to using social accountability and demand side of governance approaches in core analytics (including global challenge programs), enhanced county engagement, and financing at the country level.

#9: Expand, deepen, finance, monitor, and report partnerships with citizens and CSOs to detect and prevent waste, fraud, and corruption and fund such partnerships at a scale proportionate to the challenges involved. In particular, promote partnerships among local civil society and independent in-country accountability institutions.

#10: IDA partners consider establishing a Bank-housed facility to close funding gaps for the participation of local CSOs in IDA country engagement and accountability activities. Such a funding facility could initially:

   a. provide grants to local CSOs for analytical work to enable their meaningful participation in the IDA’s country engagement activities, including the updated core analytics;
   b. finance CSO-led independent TPM and other oversight activities to enhance process legitimacy, verify and improve results, and prevent and expose waste, fraud, and corruption in government spending; and
   c. support programs to build the technical capacity of local CSOs to participate in country engagement and TPM activities.

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