Drawing on his world-wide experiences, Dr. Vinay Bhargava will present examples of communities fighting corruption and share ideas on the huge unfulfilled roles and challenges for civic media to make a difference in this important movement.

The event called “Citizens Fighting Corruption: Roles and Challenges for Civic Media” will take place at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Thursday May 17th from 12pm-1:30pm

Click Here For More Information and to Register

Corruption Problem Addressed

The project set out to address the availability and affordability of essential drugs and medicines in DOH hospitals and CHDs across the country, targeting availability and affordability of medicines. Prior to the project intervention citizens had been prevented and commonly barred from access to low cost and yet high quality medicines. Causes were identified in inefficient procurement processes, inaccurate deliveries and poor distribution as well as inadequate warehousing and stocking of essential medicines. All of these symptoms were a result of corrupt behavior as the root cause for the distortions observed in the service delivery.

Actions Taken by NAMFREL

NAMFREL agreed with the DOH to monitor, track and follow a variety of procurement activities, using its existent network of over 100 NAMFREL chapters nationwide to mobilize volunteers and CSOs from within the communities. Volunteers engaged in:

1)      monitoring procurement activities in every hospital and regional health offices managed by DOH.

2)      monitoring delivery of essential medicines in selected hospitals and regional health offices.

3)      monitoring inventories, warehouses and medicine stocks as well as hospitals’ and CHDs’ internal systems for checking inventories.

4)      monitoring distribution of essential pharmaceutical products to entitled hospital recipients.

Local chapter leader conducted capacity building workshops and built coalitions with local CSOs to carry out the tasks, educating volunteers to successfully monitor the various reporting formats used by hospitals, suppliers, and the procurement secretariat.

During the implementation of the second phase, NAMFREL included a warehouse and pricing survey monitoring component. The price monitoring represented a lesson learnt from the MMP1 to help the DOH Bids & Awards Committee (BAC) officers to determine what a reasonable budget for the purchase of drugs and medicines would amount to.

Impact and Results Achieved

A NAMFREL volunteer during warehouse inspection

Since the inception of the program in 2004[i], NAMFREL noticed the following improvements in the health sector:

• The reputation of the DOH has dramatically increased based on scorecards completed by both government and civil society as well as validated through public opinion surveys.

• NAMFREL has successfully monitored procurement worth 1.7 Billion Pesos.

• The availability of essential medicines has improved considerably.

• The discrepancy in the delivery of the drugs and medicines to hospital and regional health offices has been reduced significantly.

• Most of the hospitals and regional health offices and BAC officers are more responsive to the role of NAMFREL volunteer-observers in the various stages of the procurement process.

• Bidding prices are more competitive and reflect a more realistic market price.

An important lesson learnt is the importance of the role of champions to bolster the push toward greater transparency and accountability. Securing the support of the DHO as well as the head of individual hospitals has been vital to ensure success in the effort to follow through with the the various monitoring exercises initiated.

Documentation

• Project completion reports (PCRs) and Project completion assessments (PCAs) can be accessed at www.ptfund.org under the “Where-we-work” tab.
• The NAMFREL website can be accessed at http://www.namfrel.com.ph/v2/home/index1.htm
• For further information please contact secretariat@namfrel.com.ph

Prepared by: Eric Jude Alvia, NAMFREL; Gerry van der Linden, PTF; Johannes Tonn, PTF

[i] The PTF grant commenced in 2008

Download Monitoring Procurement, Delivery, and Dispatch of Medicines in the Philippines »

Corruption Problem Addressed

In 2001 there were a plethora of reports, disclosing that billions of pesos were lost in textbook scams, corruption in procurement, ghost projects in textbook delivery and school-building construction. In that year, G-Watch reviewed public sector performance in two key areas: textbook delivery and school-building construction.

G-Watch findings on textbook delivery included:

• 40% of textbooks cannot be accounted for
• Suppliers deliver books seemingly randomly, anytime anywhere
• Recipients were not notified about deliveries
•  No feedback mechanism regarding schools’ receipt of books
• Documents were not properly filled and filed
• No effective sanctions for late deliveries
• 21% of difficult-to-reach elementary schools did not receive any shipments.

In addition, the prices of textbooks procured by the Department of Education (DepEd) were unreasonably high and the physical quality of the textbooks was poor with the apparent use of sub-standard materials in their production.

Actions Taken by G-Watch

The basic premise underlying the approach adopted by G-Watch in addressing corruption in the DepEd is that active participation of citizens in the critical process of governing results in more transparency and higher performance standards, minimizing corruption and deviations from rules and standards.

At the outset, a few young researchers of G-Watch conducted a pilot monitoring exercise in several parts of the country, using an easy-to-use tool that compared what was expected in terms of time, quantity, quality, cost and process of the textbook delivery with the actual values observed. In response to the findings, a pioneering initiative was launched, “Textbook Count”, that was jointly conceptualized by the DepEd leadership and G-Watch. G-Watch facilitated the first four annual rounds of monitoring and then stepped back to allow the program to continue as a government-community partnership. The key players are the DepEd’s Instructional Materials Council Secretariat (IMCS) and the Textbook Count Consortium of CSOs that organize civil society participation.

The G-Watch social accountability approach involves five elements that address the common challenges and issues confronting anti-corruption efforts in civil society.

1) The focus is on a joint and constructive effort between government and civil society. All key actors enter into a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) that clarifies the expectations and responsibilities of all parties involved. The constructive approach ensures civil society’s access to critical information, to processes and to DepEd officials, an important prerequisite for monitoring government service delivery.

Volunteers and officials receiving textbooks

2) The approach is preventive. G-Watch monitoring clarifies standards at the outset and allows monitors to see if the standards are met while the service delivery is on-going. This way monitoring serves as affirmative action, a gentle push to support compliance while allowing opportunities for immediate remedy of deviations detected in the course of monitoring through a quick feedback mechanism integrated into the system.

3) The approach is community-based and emphasizes involving beneficiaries as monitors. This is a strategic response to address two things: Scale and Empowerment. A preventive monitoring program of a nationwide service delivery requires monitors to be present where and when service delivery happens. The key to this is utilizing beneficiaries and communities at the local level, while mobilizing national- and regional-based CSOs to cover other areas of service delivery such as procurement, warehouse inspection, etc. The capacity-building of beneficiaries to act as monitors, raising awareness as to what are their rights and entitlements, addressing a critical cultural problem in the country: Many citizens have a “clientelistic” attitude, feeling they “owe” the politicians or government officials (the patrons) they receive services from. Turning beneficiaries into monitors strengthens their sense of rights and equips them with a constructive way to express their demands.

4) Fourth, G-Watch’s approach places emphasis on keeping citizen monitoring as simple and straight forward as possible through easy-to-use tools. Often tools are checklists with clear points for monitors to assess what they should be looking for. It provides the necessary space to jot down actual observations and all details required to support the observations made.

5) Finally, and to ensure objectivity as well as follow-up to the observations made by monitors, G-Watch highlights the importance of evidence and data gathered using the monitoring tools to then use the data for continuous advocacy, recommending reforms, and soliciting a public sector response that addresses shortcomings.

Impact and Results Achieved

The textbook count initiatives have had significant success over the years. Leakages in service delivery were greatly reduced. Due to due diligence and, systemic monitoring and the safeguarding of best practices in procurement, Textbook Count has been able to reduce the prices of textbooks and reduce the time allotted for procurements.

At the procedural level, and in close coordination with the DepEd, G-Watch was able to institutionalize a system for citizens to check and monitor the delivery of services. The system established builds on a variety of tools and strategies to solicit a response of concerned agencies and support of the public. Features including access to information, capacity-building activities, easy-to-use tools with clear performance indicators to generate hard data, mechanism for public-private coordination, a quick response mechanism, and a space for government-civil society processing of monitoring results obtained.

The initiative has been highly successful activating, capacitating and mobilizing citizen organizations and citizens as monitors. G-Watch observed an increase in participation of CSOs through “Textbook Count” and similar engagements with government. Awareness raising and capacity building conducted through the course of the projects has strengthened citizens’ ability and propensity to voice their concerns and improve their understanding of the complexities of governance. The atmosphere among monitors during project activities was generally hopeful, optimistic and festive – owing to the immediate gains they could observe: Textbooks delivered on time and in good conditions. As pointed out by one of the monitors: “to monitor is perspiring, but inspiring.”

Loading textbooks for shipment to a difficult-to-reach elementary school

Another result is the growing openness in the government to involve citizens in their “internal” and possibly delicate affairs such as financial management.  One of the most significant results is the improvement in public perception toward the education department: Due to its proactive involvement in the Textbook Count project, the DepEd has leaped from being perceived as one of the top three most corrupt agencies to one of the highest publically trusted agencies in the government.

Sustainability:

For these gains to be sustained and to have impact on education outcomes, the social accountability tools employed will have to be sustained and become engrained cultural practice. While the program has been adopted as a regular program within the DepEd, sustaining the participation of civil society continues to be a challenge. Involving the community is one specific response toward sustainability that relies on empowerment to be self-perpetuating, i.e. citizens would use the knowledge and skills they have acquired to obtain quality and responsive services from the government and pass this knowledge on. Developing such culture entails however extensive and long-term re-orientation and capacity-building efforts, including addressing citizen’s immediate concerns and priorities that are most often economic in nature. To reach the grassroots, national enablers like G-Watch and its counterparts in the national government will have to replicate themselves and their kind of engagement at the sub-national level. Mobilizing support and resources for this strategic endeavor of G-Watch’s work in the education sector is the next order of battle.

While the task may seem insurmountable and overwhelming, the assessment in fact means something positive: G-Watch’s work has gone past demonstrations and pilots and is transforming practices and institutions that can change the politics of governance in the country as we know it.

Documentation

• Project completion reports (PCRs) and Project completion assessments (PCAs) can be accessed at www.ptfund.org under the “Where-we-work” tab.
• G-Watch’s website can be accessed at http://gwatchdeped.wordpress.com/
• Due to the success of the project, there are various publications and materials available, including:
  Procurement Watch, Inc. (2008).
  • Yes, Pigs Can Fly!: Facing the Challenges of Fighting Corruption in Procurement. Procurement Watch and the United States Embassy.
  • Government Watch (2010). Bayanihang Eskwela Manual
  • Aceron, Joy, et.al. (2008). Government Watch Manual
  • Gonzalez, Hilda (2004). Agencies’ Actions on and Policy Responses to the G-Watch Report. Commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme. (Unpublished paper)
  • Gregorio, Simon (2006). Institutionalization Study: Going Beyond Textbook Count. Commissioned by Government Watch. (Unpublished paper)
  • Government Watch. Government Watch Localization Framework. With support from UNDP.
  • Aceron, Joy (2010). Sustaining Citizen-Government Engagement, Transforming Governance. A Paper Presented in UNDP’s RePubliko: Knowledge Sharing Week.
  • Aceron, Joy (2008). The Textbook Count Story (PowerPoint Presentation). With support from the Asian Development Bank.
  • Aceron, Joy (2011). Politicization of Allocation and the Persisting Problem of School-Building Shortage in the Philippines. (Unpublished paper)
  • Government Watch (2010). G-Watch Monitoring of School-Building Projects: A Comparative Study of the Different Modes of SBP-Construction  (2010). Commissioned by The World Bank.
  • Government Watch (2010). Philippine Education Under Construction: A Policy Study on the Government School Building Program (2010). With support from UNDP.
  • Government Watch (2011). G-Watch Assessment of the Responsiveness of the Education Budget Allocation for 2009. With support from The World Bank.
  • World Bank. Textbook Count. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTFIDFOR/Resources/4659186-1206285405516/1cEAP-PR.pdf

Prepared by: Joy Aceron, G-Watch; Gerry van der Linden, PTF; Johannes Tonn, PTF

Download Improving Education and Curbing Corruption by Monitoring Textbook Deliveries in the Philippines »

Corruption Problem Addressed

The project has been designed to address the massive corruption of funds in the areas of procurement, management, use and maintenance of vehicles by local governments (LGUs or Local Government Units). Vehicle procurement is beset by overpricing and lack of transparency in the process while gasoline reselling has also proven a serious issue. In the actual use of vehicles, public officials have been notoriously ignoring policies prohibiting the use of vehicles beyond office hours and outside of the regular work environment. There is widespread non-compliance of government bodies with the mandatory placement of “FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY” stickers and agency logos on vehicles. Officials furthermore do not comply with the mandatory use of trip tickets and with passenger regulations. In addition to addressing specific instances of corruption, Bantay Red Plate also reviewed existing policy and feedback mechanisms and the enforcement of rules and regulations related to fleet management. The on-going project was preceded by two earlier PTF-supported projects that served to pilot various approaches in three towns on the southern island of Mindanao.

Actions Taken by ECOLINK

At the core of the project is the empowerment and mobilization of citizens. Toward this end, Ecolink organized activities ranging from Anti-Corruption youth concerts, mounting posters and billboards, to facilitating the airing of Anti-Corruption radio programs in Bantay and capacity-building on the theme of legal and ethical standards in vehicle use, among many others. Workshops were conducted to build skills in expenditure analysis and policy formulation. Citizens were mobilized to monitor actual vehicle use and cases were filed with the Ombudsman. Furthermore, the project pursued legal and administrative reforms through activities such as an LGU vehicle ordinance formulation workshop and LGU vehicle inspections.

Ecolink has developed partnerships with CSOs around the country and continues to build their capacity through training workshops on corruption prevention, use and dissemination of LGU Anti-Corruption toolkits, the set-up of a hotline interlink with the office of the Ombudsman, resource generation seminars and knowledge sharing workshops with CSOs.

To date, the project involves strategic collaboration among Ecolink, the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), the Land Transportation Office, Commission on Audit, Highway Patrol Group, and the Department of Education as well as other national line agencies and donor institutions. CSOs from all over the country are capacitated to undertake various monitoring actions and provide training to LGUs on Fleet Management. The goal of magnifying the recent project impacts to a nationwide level builds on this successful collaboration between the many stakeholders engaged.

Impact and Results Achieved

The first and second phase of the project, focusing on three towns in the war-torn area of Mindanao, has resulted in public expenditure savings of approx. $250,000 USD compared to a project expenditure of $70,000 USD. As a result of the interventions directed toward raising citizen awareness and enhancing local policies, the three LGUs targeted have passed ordinances that outline the dos and don’ts in vehicle use and establish concrete mechanisms for the resolution of corruption cases. Citizen participation in tracking the proper use of vehicles has been wide-spread, spontaneous and phenomenal in its impact with more than 1000 citizens participating. Vehicle procurement processes have become more transparent and citizen volunteers have started participating in the LGUs’ bids and awards committees. Another result of the first two phases has been Ecolink’s own organizational growth and strength development. The credibility built and recognition received has encouraged Ecolink to scale up the project to a third phase covering at least 45 cities nationwide!

To successfully scale up, Ecolink identified the need to formalize its constructive engagement with the DILG and a Memorandum of Agreement (MoA) was signed between DILG, Ecolink and PTF. Ecolink has started mobilizing CSOs from the three island groups of Luzon, Visayas and Mindanao to cover the 45 municipalities envisioned for scale-up. Widening the reach of its policies, the aim is for DILG to pass a circular that will reiterate and consolidate policies concerning the proper procurement, use, management and maintenance of vehicles.

The following observations are salient lessons learned that have enabled Ecolink to further scale up Bantay Red Plate. They include:

• Projects that start up small, identify indicators, measure results and include stakeholders from the beginning on, have a better chance of being replicated

The first and second phase of the project developed monitoring tools and techniques and tested them. The project design provided for a measurable outcome indicator in the form of public expenditure savings and this gave Ecolink the leverage for project expansion.

•  A firm yet sensitive approach

Citizen-driven campaigns against corruption may encounter fierce and at times violent responses from bureaucratic institutions. The Bantay Red Plate project has experienced this also. However, with firm resolve and commitment, coupled with sensitivity to cultural and normative conditions of the project area, the demand side has eventually created sufficient pressure, a critical mass, for local executives and government officials to ultimately do what is right and comply with laws and regulations.

• Champions create champions

Signing of the MoA – Ecolink’s Paul Gangoso and DILG’s Jesse Robredo

A government official who sets an example among fellow public servants truly inspires others to become champions of good governance themselves. After all, the presence of champions within government agencies makes the role of CSOs in public reforms a lot easier. Ecolink’s experience with Bantay Red Plate has shown how a local champion, in this case Dr. Gemma Los Baños, a senior government official who endorsed and supported the project, has influenced countless others to become devoted volunteers and strengthen the project. Thus, for a project to be scaled-up, the presence of champions is crucial.

•  Partnership among CSOs

When scaling-up, a project must consider engaging support from and partnership with other CSOs. These partnerships should be on the basis of mutual cooperation, respect and recognition. They should also give partners the flexibility to implement their local project in a manner suited to the area’s concrete conditions.

Documentation

• Project completion reports (PCRs) and Project completion assessments (PCAs) can be accessed at www.ptfund.org under the “Where-we-work” tab.
• The vehicle monitoring guidelines can be accessed at www.pcsdi.org
• For additional information, please contact info@pcsdi.org

Prepared by: Paul Gangoso, Ecolink/PCSDI; Gerry van der Linden, PTF; Johannes Tonn, PTF

Download Monitoring the Use and Management of Government Vehicles in the Philippines »

Corruption Problem Addressed

The volunteer monitors were heatedly arguing with the contractor’s workers. The volunteers counted 26 bags of cement being mixed with the aggregates.  But the workers were insisting “It’s 36”. The volunteers suggested counting the fresh cement bags strewn around. The workers would not hear of it. As a result the volunteers walked out of the batching plant and sought the shade of a nearby tree along the highway where the construction of a 4.5 kilometer road was in progress, currently in the process of laying the concrete. The volunteers waited for the transit mixer to pass by to see into which road station it would pour the concrete mixture. Eventually observing the pouring, the volunteers finally left.

A weak concrete mixture, a poor sub-base preparation, the use of oversized aggregates and the presence of longitudinal and transversal cracks as well as honeycombs were the observations that prompted CCAGG to request the Central Office of the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) to suspend the implementation of the 4.5 kilometer road concreting along the Abra – Ilocos Sur Road and to send investigators.

Actions Taken by CCAGG

CCAGG was monitoring the road construction as part of its Abra Water and Irrigation Systems Watch project (AWIS), implemented with grant support from PTF. DPWH knows CCAGG is a no nonsense group. In response, it sent its quality assurance team from the Cordillera region. However, this team seemed to be in a hurry and dismissed CCAGG’s complaints lightly.  The quality assurance team tried to appease the volunteers, insisting that the road project was still on-going, that the contractor however agreed to implement corrective measures at his expense. Angry about this half-hearted response, CCAGG sent another communication to the Secretary, urging the DPWH to send another team of investigators that could not be bribed into not investigating the veracity of CCAGG’s complaint. CCAGG also requested for a boring machine to take cylindrical samples and to subject the same to laboratory testing.

While CCAGG was waiting for the arrival of the requested  experts, its own  team of engineers  and other volunteers  did  a straight line diagram of the  finished  stretch  of road  where they  reflected all observed defects.

When the experts from the Bureau of Research and Standards from DPWH’s Central Office arrived in Abra, they brought with them the requested boring machine. A tedious process of ascertaining the truthfulness of CCAGG’s complaint followed which took several days. The investigators went over project documents, visited the project, and interviewed the project engineer and the engineer responsible for testing materials. Other stakeholder interviewed included the engineer of the contractor, residents along the highway, and CCAGG itself. When the experts asked for the exact   location where the boring machine will pierce the pavement for the samples, the volunteer monitors readily acceded. Thirteen locations of the road were bored.  Each slab was numbered and guarded to ensure that the samples would not be replaced by evildoers. When these slabs were brought to the laboratory, the CCAGG went along.

Findings of the tests included:

• Laboratory tests showed that the concrete mix used in the pavement had low compressive strength. The samples met the required thickness but failed miserably in compressive strength. The required average compressive strength for concrete pavement should be equal to 24.12 MPs (3,500 psi) or more and no individual sample should be deficient by more than 15%. The low compressive strength was attributed  to the oversized aggregates, and the unwashed and  unscreened fine aggregates in the mix.

• Three major cracks were found.

• The road shoulders were not compacted simultaneously with the roadbed making it difficult to compact the shoulders using  road rollers especially on sections where the roadway  was already paved.

• Base materials were not used in some portions of the roadbed when the concrete was poured in the pavement.

A team of Volunteers ready to jump into action.

Recommendations by the experts included:

• The contractor should remove the  concrete pavement with low compressive strength  along the entire 1.5 kilometers, half lane intermittent sections and replace the same at his expense.

• The material engineer should  redesign or make  trial mixes of concrete that meets the required    compressive strength.

• The materials engineer should explain in writing why the core samples taken from the replaced concrete pavement attained low compressive strength while the records obtained from the Regional Office attested they had met the flexural  strength.

• The project engineer should explain in writing why the defective works were allowed to happen and.

• The chief of the construction division should also explain in writing why the contractor was allowed a slippage of -79% at the time of the investigation and that no catch up plan was required of him. A slippage of –20% generally merits the termination of a contract as per Dept. Order #102, series of 1988.

The secretary of the DPWH wrote a memorandum requiring the project engineer to explain the deficiencies of the project despite his presence. He was also tasked to observe how the contractor performs regarding the portions that failed to meet the required standards.

Impact and Results Achieved

After the issuance of the memorandum by the Secretary, no immediate action was taken by the DPWH Regional Office. What followed was like a game of ping-pong: The CCAGG urged the DPWH to act and come up with sanctions against the erring officials and not be content with just the required explanations in writing. The contractor in turn pleaded with CCAGG to withdraw its complaint but CCAGG remained steadfast in its decision. CCAGG referred the matter to DPWH pressing the department to act. Finally, DPWH ordered the contractor to remove and replace the 1.5 kilometer stretch of substandard road at its own expense. Following this request, the project engineer resigned out of shame.

The above illustrates well how CCAGG’s work makes a difference under the AWIS project. The project is nearly complete and discussions are being conducted with the regional offices of DPWH and other government agencies to report the monitoring findings and to probe into the reasons for the failures of the government’s own accountability systems. This dialogue will also be taken up with the central offices of the concerned departments.

Documentation

• Project completion reports (PCRs) and Project completion assessments (PCAs) can be accessed at www.ptfund.org under the “Where-we-work” tab.
• The CCAGG website can be accessed at http://www.ccagg.com/
• CCAGG’s track record can be accessed at http://www.ccagg.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&Itemid=27
• For further information please contact: ccagg2018@yahoo.com

Prepared by: Pura Sumangil, CCAGG; Gerry van der Linden, PTF

Download Monitoring Road Construction in Abra, Philippines  

Corruption Problem Addressed

SVYM conducted a baseline survey that identified irregularities and documented the extent of corruption experienced. These issues included the quality and quantity of food grains distributed under the PDS scheme, the maintenance of records, insufficient supply and overpricing, faulty measuring devices, hoarding grains and black marketing. Eligible citizens did not receive ration cards while ineligible persons received Below Poverty Line (BPL) cards. Vigilance committees and community oversight to demand better service delivery were not well functioning.

FPS owners routinely denied citizens their mandated rations, keenly aware that beneficiaries would not approach the oversight authorities due to a lack of awareness and information about their rights. Not all FPSs displayed correct information, including stock positions and prices on the display boards. 41% of households said there was sufficient information displayed while 42.4% said it was incomplete. Roughly 16% reported that there was either no display board or no information written on it. About 5% had no knowledge about the necessity for a display board at all. At the same time it was found that if individual beneficiaries demanded the full entitlement, FPS owners tended to issue the allotted rations without demur.

Actions Taken by SVYM

At the outset of the project SVYM conducted an extensive baseline survey, which helped to pinpoint particular issues and weaknesses in the PDS distribution scheme. Upon analysis of the survey, SVYM organized recurring multi-stakeholder meetings bringing together government officials, FPS owners, CSOs, CBOs and community members in order to foster constructive engagement between the different parties.

RTI Clinic at a village fair

SVYM engaged in a variety of activities geared toward awareness raising and capacity building that included tools and strategies such as street plays and video showings, the use of various media outlets, street paintings and even door-to-door campaigning. Overall SVYM trained some 1075 students in 17 schools and empowered 80 youth groups to as well as 60 NGO representatives to use the Right to Information (RTI) Act as a tool to demand information. The trainings often included government officials.  SVYM furthermore laid the groundwork to install and empower citizen vigilance committees, a task to be implemented during the second phase of the project. To achieve sustainability, SVYM has paid special attention toward fostering young leaders with the intention to groom youths to take the fight against corruption forward in the future.

Impact and Results Achieved

The results achieved include:

• 300 new BPL cardholders from within the project area, out of a total of 536 newly distributed cards.
• Critically augmented awareness levels regarding beneficiaries’ rights and responsibilities toward entitlements from FPS owners by the community.
• Government officials maintain closer contact with the public and have become more responsive. FPS owners have agreed to work with SVYM and the community.
• Youth groups have actively started demanding their full entitlements from FPS owners.
• The number of RTI applications has increased, as has use of SVYM’s RTI Facilitation Center.

Government officials have started attending all meetings organized by SVYM and interact regularly with communities, showing an increased rate of responsiveness and accountability. Another result was the increased focus exhibited by the Food Inspector who now pays special attention to PDS and visits FPSs in the villages and tribal hamlets regularly, along with SVYM team members, taking necessary action if needed.

Documentation

• Project completion reports (PCRs) and Project completion assessments (PCAs) can be accessed at www.ptfund.org under the “Where-we-work” section.
• The SVYM website can be accessed at http://www.svym.org/
• For further information please contact: svym@svym.org.in

Prepared by: M. Chethankumar, SVYM; Indira Sandilya, PTF; Karti Sandilya, PTF; Johannes Tonn, PTF

Download Empowering the Youth to Demand Corruption-Free Service Delivery in India »

Corruption Problem Addressed

Local government is the third level of government in Sri Lanka, after the levels of central government and provincial councils. The local government bodies are known as local authorities. They are responsible for providing a variety of local public services including roads, sanitation, drains, housing, libraries, public parks, markets and recreational facilities. Local authorities are divided into three different groups: municipal councils, urban councils and Pradeshiya Sabha (PS) – divisional councils. All local authorities are elected using the open list proportional representation system.

Many local government officials and elected council members are not familiar with the principal legislation framework, governing local government in Sri Lanka, the Pradeshiya Sabha Act of 1987 (PS Act), its related procedures and financial regulations. Corruption issues identified during the preliminary needs assessment phase of the TISL-PTF program identified the limited opportunities for community engagement at the local government level in the Reedimaliyadda Division PS.

Despite the commitment of newly elected members of the Reedimaliyadda PS to enhance community participation in the governance process, there is limited capacity to do so. The absence of a participatory strategic intervention (division development plan), and limited financial provisions for such engagement accentuate the problem. These problems lead to poor governance and poor quality of life for local people. These issues are widespread and were explicitly captured in the focus group discussions and survey.

Actions Taken by TISL

As a first step, TISL conducted a discussion with the apex authority mandated with capacity building and knowledge enhancement of local government officials, the Sri Lanka Institute of Local Governance (SLILG), and the local authority commissioner in the selected province, to plan the training and prepare the content and supporting material. In addition, a TISL local partner, a local community radio station (Uva Community Radio), shared their “People’s Voice” program plan with elected members.

A two day training program for 10 elected members and 4 government officials focused on: (i) the significance of transparency and accountability for good governance, (ii) mapping administrative institutions and elected institutions and their functions, and the local governance system and its relation to provincial and central structures, and (iii) provisions in the PS Act relevant to people’s participation and financial regulations. In addition, the concept of a development plan was explained and the steps to prepare a participatory development plan were identified.

A public meeting was held with the Provincial Council Minister, elected officials and the public to share the development plan approach. A Citizen Committee was formed to represent six working areas of the PS. Two consultation meetings were held with the Citizen Committee to prioritize problems. A four day stakeholders meeting formulated a draft development plan.

The SLILG partnered with TISL in the design of the participatory development plan and knowledge sharing exercises. Thirty problems related to service delivery were identified through discussions held between the community and council members, ten of whom were trained on the PS Act and rules and procedures, especially on the financial aspects.

The local community radio station is also a key partner in this project. It is allocating air time to give Reedimaliyanda citizens the opportunity to voice their concerns on governance issues, focusing on corruption. The station also follows up on the response of government officials to these issues and set out to monitor actual service delivery.

The local market – an outsourcing responsibility of the PS few community members know about

Impact and Results Achieved

As an outcome of the training, 10 elected members were assigned to identify specific problems related to PS services with the consultation of CBO leaders. They also took responsibility to mobilize the public which is in the PS Act to ensure citizen participation. In addition, seven steps were identified to prepare the participatory development plan and budget.

The TISL-PTF intervention is unique in analyzing the local governance landscape and providing support to the Reedimaliyanda PS to develop a four year participatory development plan with community participation. The Chairman said:

“Local elections are only the first step on the path to community participation. Voting once every four years and then leaving us [elected representatives] to carry on with our work is one approach. But it is an approach that does not necessarily bring about effective democratic PS [...]. Community participation is one of the key pillars that make a PS effective. But it does not just happen. In more centralised cultures, local people may expect local members and officials to make the decisions, to tell them what to do. They are not used to sharing in decision-making. Community participation is something the PS must work at. It needs a strategy both to engage local people and to bring local organisations into constructive partnerships. Therefore the four year planning document is very important to us”.

Documentation

• Project completion reports (PCRs) and Project completion assessments (PCAs) can be accessed at www.ptfund.org under the “Where-we-work” tab.
• A variety of documents can be found on TI Sri Lanka’s website at http://www.tisrilanka.org/

Prepared by: Kalaimangal Thagavelu, TISL; Warren Van Wicklin, PTF; Johannes Tonn, PTF

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Corruption Problem Addressed

It is now widely recognized that to successfully protect and manage community forest resources, local people must be fully involved. Drawing on this insight, Nepal’s 1976 National Forestry Plan made space for local people to participate in the management of forest resources. This was followed by the landmark Forest Act in 1993, calling for Community Forest User Groups (CFUGs) to be created with a view to managing use and development of community forest resources. Thus, on paper, CFUGs were empowered to manage and protect community forest areas. However, a lack of accountability and transparency and a high level of corruption, especially in the Terai (Jungle area), have hobbled the effectiveness of these groups. In March 2010 Forest Action set out to change this, piloting the reform of a CFUG, the Dhankheti CFUG, in the Morang District of Nepal.

Based on an initial survey, Forest Action found that forest officials, timber smugglers, local elites and the Dhankheti CFUG Executive Committee members were all involved in a well organized illegal timber trade network. In many cases, the local elites used the smugglers to poach timber. At the same time, forest officials had encouraged some of the local operators to engage in illegal logging from which they were able to extract sizable benefits for themselves.

The CFUG and the forest authority had failed to stop these practices. According to the Federation of Community Forest User Groups Nepal, the Dhankheti CFUG was indeed one of the worst performing CFUGs in the country.

Actions Taken by Forest Action

Forest Action discussed these issues with the CFUG, inviting its members to reconsider their tolerance of illegal logging and poor forest management practices. These deliberations were shared with a wider public through TV, FM radio and local newspapers, thereby amplifying the issues and pressurizing the CFUG members and the forest officials to change their behavior.

Forest Action mounted a training program for the CFUG members and other stakeholders aimed at raising awareness and building institutional and technical capacities for good governance. Members were taught book-keeping and participatory action learning techniques were used to teach the CFUG to become more accountable and transparent.

Specific activities included:

• Launching FM radio programs to create awareness on corruption in community forestry and explain what might be done to curb it.
• Forming a sub-district level network of CFUGs and a watch-dog committee to monitor and minimize forest corruption within the area.
• Undertaking public audit and public hearing activities to promote the accountability and transparency of the stakeholders, particularly the CFUG Executive Committees.
• Promoting self-monitoring of the day-to-day operations of the CFUGs. To this end, guidelines and good governance indicators were drafted in association with CFUGs and FECOFUN and piloted in the CFUG.
• Establishing an information hub to promote knowledge sharing and develop policy briefs for wider dissemination.

Impact and Results Achieved

The main impact of the project in the first year has been the communities’ and stakeholders’ increased understanding of the corruption issues being practiced by CFUG Executive Committee members.

CFUGs have successfully instituted new local rules for corruption-free delivery of CFUG services, and for the planning and management of their community forest which have led to increased forest-related benefits to the poor and marginalized households. These households have been given a greater voice in decision-making processes and are able to influence decisions. Members of the CFUGs were furthermore empowered to more effectively deal with the forest authority representatives and forest traders.

The promotion of CFUG networks and multi-stakeholder watch-dog committees is playing a vital role in increasing transparency, accountability and overall control of corruption by curbing incidences of bribery, illegal logging and timber smuggling.

To institutionalize good governance within the CFUGs, Forest Action has focused on improving the internal processes such as meetings and better record keeping, promoting villagers’ participation. Public audits and public hearings have been initiated. All these activities have served to give community members a greater stake in and ownership of the community’s forest resources including the poor, women and marginalized groups.

CFUGs have now started to maintain a minimum standard of organization, including following legal provisions and operational plans as well as keeping proper financial records. A majority of Executive Committee members are now well informed about CFUG finances. A survey found that 75% of Executive Committee members were aware of the CFUG decisions regarding forest resources compared to the earlier situation in which this information was monopolized by the ‘major three’, namely the Chairperson, Secretary and Treasurer of any one CFUG.

About half of the total budget is spent on community development works. More than half their members have a basic knowledge of their rights and responsibilities. Gender and social inclusion has also improved remarkably – more than half of the committees’ members are women and include significantly more Dalits, Janajatis and other minorities than was the case before the project started. Importantly, Forest Action reports that at least 75% of meeting minutes and general assembly decisions are being implemented.

Public hearing and public auditing system are now in place for the first time in the history of CFUGs. They have now started internal auditing and once the reports are produced, they are made public.  A Forest Action survey found that as a result of all these initiatives illegal logging and the smuggling of timber had decreased by 80% in the project area. For the first time, CFUG members have launched organized protest actions against involvement of forest authorities in deforestation and forest corruption, and against policies promulgated by forest authorities detrimental to rights and interest of community forest users. The iron triangle of forest sector corruption (political elite, commercial interests, forest authorities) has been greatly weakened and, with further sustained efforts, it can be entirely removed.

A Forest Operational Plan has been prepared by the CFUG. This is a five year plan for the conservation and management of the forest resources in their area. The CFUG has developed a process for marketing forest products and products are distributed according to committee decision.

Documentation

• Project completion reports (PCRs) and Project completion assessments (PCAs) can be accessed at www.ptfund.org under the “Where-we-work” tab.
• Forest Action’s website can be accessed at http://www.forestaction.org/
• For more information, please contact bishwa@forestaction.org

Prepared by: Bishwa N. Paudyal, Forest Action; Dante de los Angeles, PTF; Johannes Tonn, PTF

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]]> http://ptfund.org/2012/04/curbing-forestry-corruption-nepal/feed/ 0 http://ptfund.org/2012/04/corruption-free-livelihood-entitlements-karnataka-india/ http://ptfund.org/2012/04/corruption-free-livelihood-entitlements-karnataka-india/#comments Tue, 24 Apr 2012 04:56:13 +0000 Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF) http://ptfund.org/?p=1998 Paraspara Trust (PT), a local CSO in Karnataka, India, has successfully implemented the project: “Addressing Corruption in the Public Distribution System (PDS) by Citizen Groups – a pilot project in Bangalore”. The project empowered citizens to ensure corruption-free service delivery of social safety net entitlements as set forth by the law. The project was a success; the incentives for citizens to follow the project objectives and methodology should be self-perpetuating in the long run. However the challenge of sustainability remains.

Corruption Problem Addressed

Info

CSO: Paraspara Trust (PT)
Years: 2009 – 2010
Country: Karnataka, India
Amount: $ 17,850 USD
Sector: Controlling Corruption in Delivery of Social Services: Social Safety Net

Corruption Problem: Fair price shop owners embezzle entitlement benefits and authorities do not intervene
Tools employed: Capacity Building, Survey, Focus Group, Vigilance Committee, Advocacy, Community Empowerment, Coalition Building

Corruption in the Public Distribution System (PDS), a social safety net entitlement program, is a major issue in India. Corruption permeates seemingly all government departments in Karnataka, including the Department for Food and Civil Supplies. The complex system of intermediaries and contractors active in purchase, distribution, and stocking of commodities gives way to often harmful discretionary decision-making by officials and makes oversight and control difficult.

A maximum of corrupt activities takes place in the issuance of BPL/APL (Below Poverty Line/Above Poverty Line) cards to eligible families, where the victims are the urban poor and the most vulnerable. PT conducted a survey in 30 urban slum communities covering 5,000 families to identify BPL eligible families. The survey identified about 750 eligible families (15%), who either did not have BPL or APL ration cards or reported having to pay middlemen to bribe the concerned officials to obtain the entitlement cards. Based on these findings, PT identified a variety of corruption problems, mainly pertaining to the issuance and management of the distribution of BPL/APL cards.

As a consequence and in the absence of BPL cards, eligible poor families purchase rations from the open market and pay more than INR 25/kg for rice and INR 40/litre for kerosene (the primary fuel for cooking). As most family members are daily wage earners in unorganized (non-unionized) sectors, like construction and garments, or are domestic servants, these prices are unaffordable to them. Their livelihood is threatened and their guaranteed rights are violated. Ironically, the government is trying to reduce the issuance of BPL cards, since there are so many bogus cards. This compounds the difficulty of getting a BPL card.

Actions Taken by PT

Baseline survey: With the support of independent volunteers and PDS Monitoring Committee (PDSMC) members, Paraspara Trust conducted a survey regarding access to PDS in 30 urban slum communities of Bengaluru. 5,000 families from these 30 slum communities were included in the survey.  The survey showed three types of information: details of eligible families, shop owners’ information, and views of interviewers. It revealed that 15% of eligible families (750 out of 5,000) did not have BPL/APL cards, and that shop owners possessed bogus BPL cards at about 10-20% of the total entitlement claims made at their shops. Shop Owners misused these cards to sell commodities in the black market for higher prices.

Focus Group Discussions: PT shared the survey information with the community through 30 focus group discussions. It highlighted the survey findings and explained the problems faced by eligible families. These discussions brought in more information and PT realized that most community members had paid more than INR 500 for their entitlement cards (instead of the stipulated INR 67) and even though had not yet received their cards. One fair price shop had 30 additional bogus BPL cards apart from the 150 legitimate cards allotted to it. In another case, two brothers had a shop license each, but were maintaining only one shop. Eligible families, PDSMC members and PT volunteers communicated the results of the focus group discussions to the Department of Food and Civil Supplies, making four visits to the Department.

Orientation of PDSMC members: PT organized four orientation sessions for PDSMC members to empower them to work towards corruption-free PDS outlets in the community. The results of the survey and the importance of model fair price shops to prevent corruption in PDS were discussed also. 120 PDSMC members participated in these sessions and planned PDSMC-level action plans to prevent corruption in the future, issuing new cards to eligible families. The plans also included provisions for the availability of corruption-free commodities in the fair price shop.

Key Actors: The main actors to exert transparency, and hold service providers accountable are the PDSMC members. They are community volunteers who have stepped forward to fight corruption and devote time and energy to monitor the PDS scheme. PT provided these volunteers with information and training to plan and act locally. At the next higher level, representatives from the PDSMCs try to coordinate efforts with the government officials, other NGOs, and the general public in the Dhanya Hakku Vedike (DHV or Food Rights Forum).



Members of the Dhanya Hakku Vedike

Eligible family members were also identified as key participants. They participated in awareness raising activities to act integer and not pay bribes, thereby preventing and acting against corruption bottom-up. As the ultimate beneficiaries, their role and involvement is vital. Finally, officials from the Department of Food and Civil Supplies play a key role, as they are the ‘receiving end’. In addition to the stakeholders above, PT set out to work directly with the fair price shop owners and their association to better understand the causes of corruption and to elicit their support in cleansing the system. PT and the Right to Food Campaign provide necessary inputs to the program by way of training, information, and facilitation of efforts at grassroots and official levels.

Challenges: The immediate challenge in the program was to deal with informal community leaders who exploit people as middle man. They are the nexus between the officials and eligible families. It proved equally challenging to orient and sensitize government officials and engage them constructively to fight corruption as there are a number of officials who directly benefit from the corrupt practices. Another tough challenge has been the identification of bogus ration cards that are hidden from plain view. Trying to identify fake cards, PDSMC members and PT staff were threatened by middle man and fair price shop owners. Finally, there is a challenge preventing political interference in the system as the huge profits tempt politicians to use their powers to influence and meddle with the service delivery to appropriate funds for cronies or themselves.

Impact and Results Achieved

Notwithstanding the difficult environment, PT obtained excellent results and worked vigorously to overcome the challenges posed:

• The conducted survey and its results served as a welcome and much needed tool for advocacy.
• Bribe payments to community leaders and middlemen were reduced by 75%.
• PT enabled the processing of 240 pending applications of BPL cards to eligible families.
• 120 PDSMC members work in the community.
• Officials agreed to check the bogus cards and to engage with the communities.
• The two brothers agreed to open separate outlets as required by their licenses.
• PDSMC and DHV members have been sensitized, educated and empowered.
• PT increased the effective participation of citizens in the Right to Food Campaign

The sustainability of the program relies on the PDSMC and DHV volunteers to check on corruption in their communities and allow citizens to benefit from the laws that are in place, however not enforced and monitored sufficiently by the government agencies responsible. While there is no direct monetary cost involved in running these groups, volunteers have the incentive to come together and act as they themselves benefit from the correct administering of the PDS scheme. The absence of PT will not deter them from continuing their activities they have learned in the short period of one year.  Given the prominence and focus on the issue of corruption at both local but also the national level, the groups promoted through this project will continue to evolve as a movement, perhaps not even limited to the PDS scheme alone.

Documentation

• Project completion reports (PCRs) and Project completion assessments (PCAs) can be accessed at www.ptfund.org under the “Where-we-work” tab.
• PT’s website can be accessed at http://paraspara.org/index.php
• For more information, please contact paraspara2001@yahoo.com

Prepared by: K.C. Venkatesh, Paraspara Trust; Indira Sandilya, PTF; Johannes Tonn, PTF

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]]> http://ptfund.org/2012/04/corruption-free-livelihood-entitlements-karnataka-india/feed/ 0 http://ptfund.org/2012/04/reducing-corruption-nrega-odisha-india/ http://ptfund.org/2012/04/reducing-corruption-nrega-odisha-india/#comments Tue, 24 Apr 2012 04:41:56 +0000 Partnership for Transparency Fund (PTF) http://ptfund.org/?p=1964 Corruption in India is rampant and especially harmful where the effects of embezzlement, extortion and bribery affect the poorest. Following a report that 75% of the funds budgeted for the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) had been shifted into officials’ pockets, VICALP, a local CSO, set out to affect change. VICALP implemented the “Reducing the opportunities for corruption in NREGA in 12 Panchayats of Mohana block of Gajapati district, Odisha” project, using capacity building exercises to empower communities and capacitate citizens to monitor how social safety net provisions were implemented by the authorities. Prompting authorities to be more transparent and accountable in accordance with the rules and regulations that should govern the delivery of social services were an effective way to achieve better service delivery and ensure citizens’ rights to the entitlements as stipulated in NREGA.

Corruption Problem Addressed

Info

CSO: Visionaries of Creative Action for Liberation and Progress (VICALP)
Years: 2009
Country: Odisha State, India
Amount: $ 20,900 USD
Sector: Controlling Corruption in Delivery of Social Services: Social Safety Net

Corruption Problem: Benefits of a nationally financed entitlement program do not reach the intended beneficiaries
Tools employed: RTI, Capacity Building, Social Audit, Constructive Engagement, Coalition Building, Citizen Monitoring, Advocacy

NREGA and the Right to Information Act (RTI) are the two most progressive pieces of legislation in the history of India. If implemented in letter and spirit, these historic acts have the potential to transform rural India. While the RTI Act provides provisions for citizens to demand information from authorities, NREGA assures that a certain amount of workdays is given to the unemployed, paying basic wages and complying with the minimum standards of a decent workplace. Odisha is the poorest state in India with a very high percentage of the rural population living in abject poverty and with chronic hunger.

In 2007, the government of Odisha claimed that 154,118 families eligible to receive benefits under NREGA completed 100 days of employment and received respective payment. The Centre for Environment and Food Security (CEFS) conducted a survey on NREGA implementation in 100 villages in the 6 poorest districts in Odisha in the same year. According to CFES, families in Odisha were given an average of 57 days of paid. Furthermore, not more than 5 days of actual employment time had been allotted to each family in average. There was not a single instance of 100 day employment in any of the 100 surveyed villages. The study revealed that 75% of the NREGA funds earmarked for Odisha were pocketed by officials during 2006/2007. With its findings, CFES approached the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court charged the Government of Odisha with a Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) inquiry. This is clear evidence of deep rooted corruption in NREGA in Odisha State.

Actions Taken by VICALP

To initiate the project, VICALP conducted a sample survey in 50 villages and found that corruption in NREGA was even worse than the findings of the CEFS survey indicated. Even for job card applications, people had to bribe officials and many workers never received wages. VICALP targeted 49 villages and indirectly involved 200 villages from 12 Panchayats. Major activities included:

• Promotion of community based organizations (CBOs) in the target villages;
• Formation of 12 anti-corruption “Social Watch Committees” (SWCs) in 12 Panchayats;
• Intensive training of 84 Social Watch Volunteers (SWVs) on NREGA and RTI-use;
• Panchayat level orientation training for 1031 community leaders;
• 156 bi-monthly meetings by SWCs to review and monitor NREGA corruption, developing Panchayat level target plans by people’s committees;
• Instructions an assistance using the RTI to expose corruption;
• Establishing constructive engagement and a working relationship with government officials to reduce opportunities for corruption to take place;
• Ensuring peoples participation in Gram Sabha meetings;
• Conducting social audits in 12 target panchayats;
• Asserting people’s rights through lobbying and advocacy;

Implementing these activities, VICALP had to overcome a variety of challenges:

1. Corrupt officials and members of the Panchayat Raj Institution (PRI) used strong-arm tactics (threats, physical attacks, false charges, and urging villagers not to allow VICALP workers and social watch volunteers to enter the villages) to block project implementation.
2. Uncooperative government officials created hurdles – at least in the beginning of the project.
3. Communal violence proved to be an obstacle for inter-community action for several months.

Despite these obstacles, the program facilitators, social watch volunteers, and campaign leaders made extra efforts to achieve the project’s goals. A mass gathering involving all the department heads and PRI members was organized at the block headquarters. This gathering proved to be a turning point in soliciting constructive engagement with government officials and PRI members. Department heads and PRI leaders were forced to take a public stand on the issue and concluded to be paying special attention henceforth. The anti-corruption campaign received a notable boost. VICALP frequently discussed project progress with the District Collector also, keeping the issues and constructive collaboration with authorities on the top of the agenda. As the District Collector started to pay attention to the grievances of anti-corruption campaign leaders, RTI requests received responses and some of the corrupt officials were punished. The campaign gained momentum.



Chandiput village job card holders demanding work

Impact and Results Achieved

An internal evaluation by VICALP and an external evaluation by PRIYA (New Delhi) assessed the impact of the project: VICALP has established a strong base in 200 villages through village level CBOs. The Social Watch Volunteers have helped the anti-corruption campaign to spread. This has provided opportunities for community solidarity and has strengthened community organizations to fight corruption.

Constructive engagement not only enhanced community confidence but also made citizens more skilful and effective as negotiators and leaders. This community empowerment will ultimately promote the sustainability of the project. The entire process is completely owned by communities. VICALP and the communities also noted that here are sincere and responsible government officers who are looking for opportunities to help fight injustice and corruption. The campaign tried to actively involve these officials to reduce the opportunities for corruption.

The following are some of the impacts of VICALP’s anti-corruption campaign:



Results furthermore include, that

• 100% of job card holders have accounts and passbooks in their name.
• 110 cases of irregularities were identified and discussed.
• RTI requests were filed for 55 of these cases, 25 out of them were solved by the block grievance cell, 20 cases are at the second level, 2 cases have been forwarded to the Odisha RTI commission, and 9 others were resolved before the response to the RTI request.
• A Junior Engineer of the block was fined 15,000 rupees.
• A Junior Engineer returned money which he had taken as a bribe.
• A village level worker was suspended for corruption.
• 74 new NREGA projects were sanctioned.
• The number of NREGA work days increased.
• NREGA average wages increased from 35 to 90 rupees per day.
• Gram Sabha meetings in 11 Panchayats had the participation of 60-70% of the villagers.

These findings document the results that a relatively small intervention can make: Fostering civil society to hold the government accountable to the promises made.

Documentation

• Project completion reports (PCRs) and Project completion assessments (PCAs) can be accessed at www.ptfund.org under the “Where-we-work” tab.
• Other project documents including the baseline survey, quarterly reports, semi-annual reports, annual reports, and the final evaluation report by PRIYA (New Delhi) can be found on VICALP’s website at http://www.vicalp.org/
• The Centre for Environment and Food Security (CEFS) webpage can be found at http://www.cefs-india.org/

Prepared by: Kumar Prasant, VICALP; Warren van Wicklin, PTF; Johannes Tonn, PTF

Download Measurable Results Reducing Corruption in the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act in Odisha, India »

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